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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities fraud has increasingly become a global economic problem. It is endemic
in many domestic markets, such that its aggregate impact, calculated globally, is
significant. 1 Furthermore, as a result of the growth in foreign exchange listings, global
securities offerings, and cross-border investment activity, securities fraud perpetrated in
one market often affects others. The regulatory community has developed a range of
mechanisms that explicitly address securities fraud as a global issue. These include
cooperation and coordination instruments such as bilateral memoranda of understanding
between regulatory agencies, as well as the work of multilateral organizations such as the
International Organization of Securities Commissions. 2 In addition, and increasingly,
private litigation-particularly in U.S. courts 3 -functions as a tool to combat
international securities fraud.
The use of private enforcement in U.S. courts to address cross-border fraud has
proved complicated. This is not surprising: Rule 1 Ob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act), which serves as the basis for most private fraud litigation,
creates only an implied cause of action and therefore contains no legislative guidance
concerning its application in cases with foreign elements. The most fundamental issue in
cross-border cases-the extent of the reach of U.S. securities laws-therefore remains
disputed.4 In addition, the deployment of both express and implied rights of action in the
cross-border context often creates significant jurisdictional and procedural complications.
Courts addressing cross-border securities cases have grappled with questions such as the
advisability of using prudential doctrines such as forum non conveniens to dismiss
predominantly foreign cases; 5 the availability of judicial assistance to foreign courts
when parallel litigation is underway in another country; 6 and the appropriateness of
certifying plaintiff classes that include investors from countries that do not themselves
permit class actions. 7 This Article considers another such issue: the circumstances under
1. See generally TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, STRENGTHENING CAPITAL
MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD (2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD192.pdf (noting that a surge in global financial scandals had prompted the committee to form an
international task force to investigate financial fraud).
2. For recent treatments of developments in international securities regulation, see generally Michael D.
Mann, William P. Barry & Alon Cohen, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement,
1743 PLl/Corp 789 (2009); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 883 (2009).
3. Although private enforcement of securities laws plays an especially prominent role in the United
States, it is on the rise in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor
Confidence in Europe: U.S.-Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 281, 290 (2006) (describing the increase in private enforcement procedures in Europe).
4. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-
Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under
Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 57 (2007)
(analyzing current doctrine on the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws).
5. See, e.g., Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950-51 (lst Cir. 1991) (applying forum non
conveniens to an American shareholder's securities fraud claims against a Canadian corporation).
6. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2004)
(addressing a petition for discovery assistance by plaintiffs in a German securities lawsuit).
7. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (assessing the
likelihood that courts in various countries would recognize the preclusive effect of a settlement or judgment
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which the directors of foreign companies may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of
U.S. courts.
8
When a foreign company participates in U.S. capital markets, its directors assume
certain governance responsibilities related to that participation. As a consequence, they
face potential liability under U.S. law for failures to fulfill those responsibilities. Like the
directors of U.S. companies, then, foreign directors may be sued by private plaintiffs
seeking monetary damages in civil litigation. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, however,
foreign directors are not always subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In the
context of cross-border fraud, jurisdictional law therefore creates a barrier to the use of
private litigation in enforcing director accountability requirements.
Part II of this Article sketches out the governance obligations assumed by the
directors of foreign companies that engage in U.S. securities activity, and the potential
liability of those directors under the securities laws. Part III then turns to the law
governing personal jurisdiction of foreign defendants in U.S. courts, and examines its
application in the context of securities litigation. It identifies some inconsistencies in how
courts have applied jurisdictional standards to cross-border securities cases, traceable in
part to the fundamental vagueness of the constitutional due process requirements
underpinning those standards. The Article then explores the tension between
jurisdictional law and the enforcement goals reflected in the securities laws, and, in Part
IV, considers three possible ways to reduce that tension. It ultimately proposes that courts
adopt jurisdictional presumptions designed to reflect Congress' intent in imposing certain
express accountability requirements upon directors. These presumptions, I argue, will
satisfy the due process protections embodied in jurisdictional law, while bringing that law
into better alignment with regulatory expectations regarding the responsibility of
corporate directors for an issuer's securities activity.
II. THE SECURITIES-RELATED ROLES OF FOREIGN DIRECTORS
Foreign companies participate in the U.S. equity markets at a variety of levels of
engagement. Some arrange for the sale of their ordinary shares to U.S. investors in
private placements that are exempt from U.S. registration requirements under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). 9 Others list their shares on a U.S. national
exchange, creating a public U.S. trading market for the foreign securities and thereby
assuming ongoing reporting obligations under the Exchange Act. 10 Many foreign
reached in a U.S. securities class action).
8. This Article addresses jurisdiction over the foreign (i.e., non-U.S. resident) directors of foreign
companies, and uses "foreign directors" as a shorthand reference to that category. I do not address jurisdiction
over the foreign directors of U.S. companies, or over U.S.-resident directors of foreign companies.
9. Rule 144A under the Securities Act creates an exemption for the private resale of securities to
qualified institutional buyers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009).
10. Section 12(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires registration under the Act of all securities traded on
a national securities exchange, contains no general exemption for securities issued by foreign companies. See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006). As a result, foreign companies that list their ordinary shares on a national
exchange must register, triggering the periodic reporting requirements of section 13(a). 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(2006). Foreign private issuers subject to those requirements must file annual reports, as well as current reports
of material information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2009); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-16 (2009). Unlike domestic issuers,
however, they need not file quarterly reports. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13(b)(2) (2009).
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companies choose not to create a U.S. market in the foreign securities themselves, but
instead to sponsor an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) program. Under such a
program, a U.S. depositary bank issues ADRs, each representing a certain number of
shares of the issuer's ordinary shares, for purchase by U.S. investors. 1 Some of these
programs are restricted to specific investors; for instance, ADRs may be sold in a private
placement to qualified institutional buyers. 12 Many, however, are intended to create a
public trading market for the issuer's securities in the United States; as a result, the issuer
in question must comply with various registration and reporting requirements intended to
protect U.S. investors. 13 ADRs issued through a Level 1 program are traded on the over-
the-counter market rather than on a national securities exchange; therefore, an issuer
choosing that type of program assumes very few registration and reporting obligations. 14
In a Level 2 program, the ADRs are listed on a U.S. exchange. Consequently, in addition
to filing an initial registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), 15 the issuer must thereafter comply with periodic reporting requirements under
the Exchange Act. 16 Finally, an issuer may choose not merely to deposit existing shares
into the program, but to issue new shares for purchase by U.S. investors in the form of
ADRs. This requires the establishment of a Level 3 (capital raising) program, which
involves additional registration requirements along with the assumption of periodic
reporting obligations. 17
When a foreign issuer engages in such securities activity in the United States, the
governance obligations of the issuer's directors attach to that activity. As a result, the
directors may be subject to liability in resulting litigation. This Part discusses the
implications of participation in the U.S. markets for foreign directors.
A. Sources of Securities-Related Governance Obligations
The primary source of a corporate director's governance responsibilities is the law
of the issuer's state of incorporation, since those responsibilities fall within the sphere of
a corporation's internal affairs. As a result, the precise contours of director obligations
vary across countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to confirm certain broad trends
regarding securities-related oversight. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development's Principles of Corporate Governance, last revised in 2004, state that a
board's responsibilities include the implementation of internal procedures designed to
11. Depositary banks can also issue unsponsored ADRs without the issuer's involvement.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009).
13. For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 9:146-149 (2008-09).
14. The initial registration statement for such a program is filed on Form F-6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)
(2009) creates a specific exemption from Exchange Act registration for these programs. An issuer taking
advantage of this exemption must publish the annual report required by the laws of its home country on its
website in English, but need not file a separate annual report with the SEC. § 240.12g3-2(b)(ii).
15. As with a Level 1 program, the initial registration statement for a Level 2 program is filed on Form F-
6.
16. Issuers sponsoring a Level 2 program must file annual reports on Form 20-F (analogous to the Form
10-K used by domestic issuers), as well as current reports of material information on Form 6-K.
17. In connection with the offering itself, the issuer would be required to file a registration statement on
Form F-I or F-3 containing a prospectus; going forward, the issuer would be required to file an annual report on
Form 20-F as well as current reports of material information on Form 6-K.
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promote compliance with securities laws, among other regulatory regimes. 18 The 2007
Report of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Technical
Committee confirms the "special role" of independent directors in this regard. 19 The SEC
has identified these as statements of best practices in the area of corporate oversight,
suggesting that a "global trend" in favor of adopting audit committees could be
identified.20 Thus, regardless of an issuer's country of incorporation, its directors are
likely subject to a range of compliance obligations under local law in connection with its
securities activity.
In addition, and more important for purposes of this discussion, directors of issuers
incorporated under foreign law are subject to the requirements of U.S. law regarding
securities-related governance if those issuers choose to list securities in the United States.
Both inside and outside directors bear responsibilities for a corporation's securities
activity. Certain inside directors (typically, the CEO and CFO) may be directly involved
in the preparation, filing, and dissemination of offering documents and ongoing reports
related to that activity. Some are also required to fulfill specific signing and certification
obligations under the securities laws. 2 1 Additionally, the board as a whole shares signing
responsibility regarding certain filings.22 One facet of the general oversight responsibility
for outside directors in particular has been described as a "securities monitoring" role. 23
This role encompasses a variety of obligations directly related to the securities activity of
corporate issuers, including:
. review of documents filed with the SEC, both in connection with securities
offerings and related to periodic disclosure; 2
4
. oversight of outside auditors and enhanced financial oversight by members
of the audit committee;
2 5
. approval of the audited financial statements included in filings with the
SEC; 26 and
. independent assessment of whether all public disclosures made by the issuer
18. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 62-63 (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/l8/31557724.pdf.
19. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, BOARD INDEPENDENCE OF LISTED
COMPANIES 41 (2007), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD238.pdf (describing the
typical responsibilities of outside directors across jurisdictions).
20. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 33-8220, pt. I,
II.F.3.a (effective Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm [hereinafter Release
No. 33-8220].
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2009) (imposing certification requirements on the principal executive and
principal financial officer of issuers filing annual reports, including on Form 20-F).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2006) (requiring registration statements to be signed by a majority of the
issuer's board).
23. Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 Bus. LAW. 1375, 1375 (2006).
24. Treatment of Information Incorporated by Reference into Registration Statements, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6335, 23 SEC Docket 401 (Aug. 5, 1981). For discussion of director obligations with respect to
periodic disclosure, see JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY § 6:2.2 (2d ed. 2008).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing
Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 400-05 (2005) (describing
Sarbanes-Oxley's enhancement of this particular role).
26. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 400-05.
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are fair and accurate. 27
During the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,28 the extent to which
U.S. securities law applies to foreign issuers, and in particular the extent to which it can
affect matters of corporate governance ordinarily governed by foreign law, became a
focal point of debate. 29 Sarbanes-Oxley introduced a number of requirements related to
corporate oversight, including a requirement that any issuer covered by the Act establish
an audit committee composed of independent directors. 30 This requirement conflicted
with practices regarding board composition in other legal regimes, many of which did not
provide for the appointment of independent directors to corporate boards. 3 1 Its proposal
therefore triggered a heated debate over the propriety of U.S. legislation mandating
changes in the internal governance structure of foreign companies. 32 While the final rule
provided certain limited exemptions from particular requirements, 33 it made no general
distinction between domestic and foreign issuers. In subjecting foreign boards to the
Act's enhanced accountability and monitoring requirements, Congress and the
Commission clarified the importance to U.S. lawmakers of imposing the same
governance expectations on foreign issuers as on domestic ones.
B. Sources of Civil Liabilityfor Failure to Fulfill Securities-Related Governance
Obligations
A result of the application of U.S. securities laws to foreign issuers is that directors
of those issuers-like directors of domestic companies-may be subject to civil liability
under U.S. law if they fail to fulfill their securities-related responsibilities. Certain
provisions of the securities laws create primary liability for individual directors. Section
27. Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to Activities of the
Independent Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380, 135 SEC Docket
1393 (Jan. 16, 1978) (discussed in Sale, supra note 23, at 1379-88).
28. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
29. The concern that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represented an encroachment on foreign corporation laws is
a variation on the more general concern that it encroached significantly on areas of corporate governance
historically reserved to the states of incorporation. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of
Corporate Governance, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39 (2004).
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2009). In its release
adopting the rule regarding listed company audit committees, the SEC affirmed the critical oversight role of
directors:
Effective oversight of the financial reporting process is fundamental to preserving the integrity of
our markets. The board of directors ... is the focal point of the corporate governance system. The
audit committee ... plays a critical role in providing oversight over and serving as a check and
balance on a company's financial reporting system.
Release No. 33-8220, supra note 20.
31. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate
Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 874-77 (2004) (discussing some of the objections raised by foreign
companies to the legislation as initially proposed).
32. See id. at 874 (describing the resulting "furor," as well as some of the concessions later made by the
SEC in its final rulemaking).
33. For instance, in systems that require employee participation on supervisory boards, an exemption was
made from the independence requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(l)(iv)(C). In systems that provide for
oversight of auditors by means of a separate board of auditors, the supervisory board need not include an audit
committee. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(c)(3).
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11 of the Securities Act, for instance, creates an express cause of action for claims in
connection with the offering of securities.34 That section provides that if a registration
statement filed with the SEC contains a material misrepresentation or omission, a person
who purchased securities offered pursuant to that statement may sue certain enumerated
defendants, including individuals who were directors of the issuer at the time of the
registration.3 5 Directors may also face primary liability under the general antifraud
prohibition established in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder,
which create an implied cause of action for many forms of securities fraud. Finally, the
express cause of action created by section 17(a) of the Securities Act provides an
additional source of liability in civil enforcement proceedings initiated by the SEC. 36
The securities laws also impose derivative liability for an issuer's violation of anti-
fraud provisions on that issuer's control persons. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
defines control person to include any person who "directly or indirectly" controls any
person liable under the Act; 37 section 15 of the Securities Act adopts a similar definition
of control person in connection with violations of section 11.38 Thus, directors who
control the issuer may face secondary liability flowing from the issuer's conduct. 3 9
A variety of remedies are available in cases that allow director liability. While civil
actions initiated by private plaintiffs generally seek monetary damages, those brought by
the SEC take advantage of a broad range of judicial remedies, including civil monetary
penalties; equitable relief, including disgorgement; injunctions against future violations;
and bar orders against future service as a director or officer of a publicly traded
company.40
In sum, exposure to various forms of civil liability encourages foreign directors, like
their U.S. counterparts, to comply with the accountability norms embodied in U.S.
securities law. Unlike domestic directors, however, foreign directors are not always
subject to the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court. This potential exemption from
jurisdiction creates an independent, and potentially significant, limitation on their liability
for securities-related misconduct.
34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006).
35. Id. Liability under this section is limited significantly by the due diligence defense provided by section
11(b); for further discussion, see infra notes 120, 138 and respective accompanying text. Section 12(a)(2)
creates similar liability for the sellers of securities on the basis of misrepresentations or omissions contained in a
prospectus or oral communication. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). Since directors are rarely "sellers" as that term
has been defined in the jurisprudence, however, liability under this section is unlikely. Section 18(a) of the
Exchange Act also creates a similar cause of action for misstatements or omissions in periodic reports; because
purchasers must demonstrate actual reliance on the fraudulent statement in question in order to assert that cause
of action, however, liability under that section is unlikely as well. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78r(a) (2006).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (2006).
39. For discussion of this form of liability, as well as its limitations, see FANTO, supra note 24, § 6:4. In
actions brought by the SEC rather than private plaintiffs, directors may also be subject to liability for aiding and
abetting a securities violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006).
40. For an overview of the judicial and administrative mechanisms available to the SEC, see DONNA M.
NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 675-78 (2d ed. 2008).
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III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DIRECTORS IN U.S. COURTS
A. Establishing Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants: General Requirements
Establishing the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court 41 over a foreign
defendant involves two separate steps. First, the forum court must establish statutory
authority to exercise jurisdiction; second, it must ascertain that the exercise of jurisdiction
will not violate the defendant's constitutional right to due process.
1. Statutory Authority
In general, a federal court's statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction over a
particular defendant derives from Rule 4(k)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which authorizes it simply to borrow the "long-arm" statute of the state in which it sits.4 2
In claims arising under certain federal laws, however, jurisdiction may be based on Rule
4(k)(1)(C), which states that service of a summons establishes jurisdiction over a
defendant "when authorized by a federal statute." 43 This is the case in claims brought
under the federal securities laws. Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides that:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this Act... or to
enjoin any violation of such Act. . ., may be brought in [the district wherein
any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred] or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant
is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.4 4
Section 22 of the Securities Act contains similar language. 45 The result is the
authorization of worldwide service of process over those alleged to have committed
securities fraud. Because service of process is the means by which a court obtains
jurisdiction, courts have concluded that where statutes provide for worldwide service of
process, Congress intended personal jurisdiction for claims arising out of violations of
securities law to extend to the limits of due process protection. 46 Thus, it is ultimately the
constitutional step of the analysis that delimits the extent of personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants in securities cases.
41. The great majority of securities lawsuits are filed in federal court, particularly since enactment of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2006)), which essentially foreclosed the option of filing securities class actions under state
rather than federal law.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(A) states that "[s]erving a summons... establishes personal jurisdiction over a
defendant... who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district
court is located ......
43. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2006).
46. See, e.g., SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1997) ("Courts have reasoned that 'a federal
statute which permits the service of process beyond the boundaries of the forum state . . .broadens the
authorized scope of personal jurisdiction. Under such a statute, the question becomes whether the party has
sufficient contacts with the United States, not any particular state."' (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co.
Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989))).
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2. Constitutional Limitations
The constitutional due process analysis follows the framework established in
International Shoe,4 7 the landmark 1945 decision of the Supreme Court, and subsequent
cases: (1) the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum "such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice,"' 4 8 and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction, taking into account "the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief,"
must be reasonable. 49 When jurisdiction is based on a statute that authorizes worldwide
service of process, as is the case under the securities laws, the minimum contacts relevant
to establish personal jurisdiction are those with the United States as a whole rather than
with any individual state. 50 The scope of the court's jurisdiction relates to the extent of
those contacts. If the defendant has engaged in systematic and continuous activity in the
United States, the court may exercise "general jurisdiction" over it-in other words, the
court may exercise jurisdiction in any claim against that defendant, whether arising from
the U.S. contacts or not. 51 If the contacts are insufficient to support general jurisdiction,
the court may nevertheless reasonably exercise "specific jurisdiction" over the defendant
in claims arising out of those contacts.5 2 In most transnational cases, the plaintiffs seek to
establish specific jurisdiction over the defendants in claims arising out of securities
activity connected to U.S. markets.
Importantly, the requirement of contacts with the United States can be met by
contacts outside the United States, on the "effects" theory of personal jurisdiction. 53
According to this effects doctrine, if a foreign defendant engages in conduct outside the
United States with the intent of causing tortious effect within the relevant U.S. forum,
that conduct satisfies the minimum contacts requirement. 54 Courts apply this test
restrictively, however. In an early securities case in the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly
asserted the need to proceed "with caution, particularly in an international context," and
stated that
47. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
48. Id. at 316.
49. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). In the case of foreign defendants,
the burden includes unique factors such as language differences, distance of travel, and the difficulties of
defending oneself in a foreign legal system.
50, See SEC v. Sofipoint, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2951 GEL., 2001 WL 43611, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,
2001).
51. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (explaining the
parameters of general jurisdiction).
52. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that even an isolated transaction in the
forum state was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a claim arising out of that transaction).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 37 (1971) ("A state has the power to exercise
judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to
any cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship
to the state makes the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable."). This doctrine is not to be confused with the
"effects test" for subject-matter jurisdiction, which is used to determine the scope of the securities laws'
application to conduct or transactions occurring outside the United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416(1)(c) (1987) (setting forth the bases for legislative
jurisdiction in securities cases).
54. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (distinguishing "mere untargeted negligence" from
"intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions ... expressly aimed at [the forum state]").
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At a minimum the conduct must meet.., the important requirement that the
effect "occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory." We believe, moreover, that attaining the rather low floor of
foreseeability necessary to support a finding of tort liability is not enough to
support in personam jurisdiction. The person sought to be charged must know,
or have good reason to know, that his conduct will have effects in the state
seeking to assert jurisdiction over him. 55
Albeit with such limitation, this doctrine therefore permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants based on foreign conduct, even in the absence of
direct contacts with the United States.
B. Application of Jurisdictional Standards in Securities Cases
1. Establishing Sufficient Contacts with the United States
The first requirement of the due process analysis is that the defendant has
established sufficient contacts with the United States to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction. In some international securities cases, plaintiffs have argued that the
defendant's role as director of a U.S.-listed company is alone enough to create the
requisite contacts. In others, they have pointed to specific acts or omissions by individual
directors. This Part considers these variations in turn.
a. Contacts Imputed on the Basis of Defendant's Status
i. Status as Control Person
As noted above, the Exchange Act imposes derivative liability for an issuer's
violation of securities law on that company's control persons. 56 Plaintiffs in transnational
cases frequently argue that where personal jurisdiction has been established over an
issuer, it should extend to that issuer's statutory control persons as well, merely by virtue
of that status. As one court put it, this theory posits that "the control person standard
automatically encompasses a jurisdictional inquiry. In other words, if [the defendant] fits
the definition of a control person, [it is] automatically subject to the jurisdiction of United
States courts ...."57 A few courts have accepted this standard, which essentially imputes
whatever minimum contacts were ascribed to the issuer to the control persons. 58
As most courts have recognized, however, the analysis of whether an individual
meets the statutory definition of control person should not be viewed as a proxy for the
jurisdictional analysis. One representative decision notes that
55. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
56. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
57. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
58. See, e.g., San Mateo County Transit Dist. v. Dearman, Fitzgerald and Roberts, Inc., 979 F.2d 1356,
1358 (9th Cir. 1992) (when addressing a non-resident defendant, stating that "personal jurisdiction ... exists if
the plaintiff makes a non-frivolous allegation that the defendant controlled a person liable for . . .fraud");
Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants, 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.N.J. 1996) (suggesting,
somewhat more vaguely, agreement with the standard articulated in San Mateo County, 979 F.2d 1356);
McNamara, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
[Vol. 35:1
Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Directors
[t]he broad understanding of control person liability adopted by the securities
laws cannot on its own support personal jurisdiction. This approach would, as
one persuasive opinion stated, "impermissibly conflate[ ] statutory liability with
the Constitution's command that the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be
fundamentally fair.".. .Though they may involve a similar contact-based
analysis, ultimately, the two inquiries must be distinct .... 59
As this analysis properly recognizes, control person liability under the Exchange
Act-created by statute-should not be confused with jurisdictional law-a
constitutional matter. Maintaining the distinction between the two is important, not only
to protect the constitutional dimension of jurisdictional analysis, but also for a practical
reason: control-person status may be construed very brohdly. Courts disagree about the
standard to be applied in defining control; 60 some have held that control-person status
can attach not only when an individual actually exercised control over particular
corporate acts, but also when that individual had merely the potential to control them.
6 1
Constitutional due process protection, on the other hand, looks to specific acts taken by a
defendant with the intent of availing itself of the benefits of doing business in the forum
in question.62 Thus, at least in jurisdictions adopting a broad reading of control-person
status, using the statutory standard to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry would undercut the
substantive protections afforded by the constitutional requirement.
In some cases, plaintiffs have argued that even if an issuer's contacts are not
automatically imputed to its control persons, a showing that the control persons knew or
should have known about the fraudulent conduct in question should be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction over them. Some courts have rejected such claims as simply
rephrasing the basic argument that contacts can be imputed to a control person on the
basis of that person's status.6 3 Several have noted that control persons may, in that
capacity, have specifically directed or approved the activities in question, thereby
establishing the requisite contacts. 64 Such cases do not rely on the status of the defendant
as a control person per se, however, but on the specific contacts established by that
defendant, and therefore resemble a more traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.
59. City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 129 (D.D.C. 2003)).
60. See generally FANTO, supra note 24, § 6:4.1 (discussing the distinction between "pure control" and
"control plus participation" standards).
61. See, e.g., MeNamara, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (noting that "the abstract power to control" was sufficient
to establish control-person liability, and "[a]ctual exercise of that power" was not required).
62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (noting that the "'fair warning'
requirement [that a defendant's activities may subject it to jurisdiction] is satisfied if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that
'arise out of or relate to' those activities" (citation omitted)); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
(stating that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws"). See also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting the "persistent
insistence of the Supreme Court ... that personal jurisdiction be premised on a showing that the defendant has,
by his acts, purposefully availed himself of the forum's benefits.").
63. E.g., In re Baan Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
64. See id at 131; see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351-52 (D.
Md. 2004) (suggesting that individual directors "who . .. , as control persons, approve the filing or
disseminating of' forms with the SEC are subject to personal jurisdiction).
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ii. Status as Board Member
A second, related theory-also dependent on considerations of status-is that board
membership alone should satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. 65 Courts have
rejected this theory as well. Mere status as a board member does not generally meet the
restrictive effects basis for jurisdiction, under which the conduct in question must
"directly and foreseeably" give rise to the effects within the United States. 66 Thus,
several courts have held that even though board members may oversee transactions that
later give rise to fraud claims, board membership in and of itself-and therefore,
presumably, a shared oversight failure-are too weakly connected to the fraud to have
directly and foreseeably given rise to the subsequent effects. 67 Indeed, courts have even
held that status as officers of the issuer is insufficient absent a showing that the officers in
question "issued any statements, effectuated any transactions, or authorized any
acquisitions that constitute the misconduct alleged ... -68
In sum, status-based arguments for jurisdiction have been unsuccessful. Despite a
split of authority regarding the viability of the control-person theory of jurisdiction, the
clear weight of precedent rejects it.69 Moreover, even in some of the cases supporting it,
it appears that an alternative basis for jurisdiction existed; for instance, in one case, while
the court stated that the prima facie showing of control-person status was sufficient to
make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, 70 it also noted that the defendant's own
contacts with the United States would have provided an adequate basis of jurisdiction. 7 1
An initial review of cases involving foreign directors yielded none in which the decision
to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign director was based solely on that director's status.
b. Contacts in the Form of Specific Acts
Because status-based arguments for jurisdiction have been largely unsuccessful,
plaintiffs generally point to particular acts of a director in arguing that sufficient contacts
have been established with the United States.
65. See In re Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing plaintiff's
allegation that an individual defendant's membership on the board was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
66. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); supra text
accompanying note 55.
67. See In re Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 399; Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 355 ("Personal
jurisdiction over [an officer] cannot be based solely on the fact that he was on the supervisory board of a
corporation with sufficient contacts in the U.S."); Charas v. Sand Tech. Sys. Int'l, Inc., 1992 WL 296406, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
68. In re Rhodia S.A. Sec. Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 527, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
69. See City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2005); see
also In re Baan Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d at 129; AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591
(9th Cir. 1996); Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99 (D. Del. 2002); In re Parmalat
Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 449,454 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
70. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
71. Id. at 639 n.13. See also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79-81 (D.D.C. 2000)
(reviewing status-theory cases and noting additional allegations of conduct related to the fraud by defendants
involved).
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i. Acts Occurring Within the United States
Occasionally, a foreign director will have engaged in conduct within the United
States in connection with alleged fraud. This is more likely in the case of inside directors,
who in the scope of their duties as officers may speak for the corporation or otherwise
engage in securities-related activity in the United States. Interestingly, where plaintiffs
allege specific acts in the United States as the basis of jurisdiction over foreign directors,
inside directors have sometimes invoked a status-based defense. They assert some
variation of an argument that if their activities within the United States were engaged in
only within the scope of their employment, they should not be subject to personal
jurisdiction. As with the status-based arguments for jurisdiction, courts have generally
rejected the application of this "fiduciary shield" doctrine. 72 One representative opinion
stated that
[w]hile a forum cannot establish personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
based solely on their status as officers in a corporation that is alleged to have
committed fraud in the United States, if the complaint sufficiently alleges that
the defendants "had a direct personal involvement in a tort committed in the
forum state," then personal jurisdiction over the defendants does not conflict
with the fundamental notions of fairness required by the due process clause. 73
Another court noted that even if the fiduciary shield doctrine were available, there
were certain exceptions to its application that would apply in cases based on securities
fraud. 74 When the director in question has engaged in securities-related conduct in the
United States, then, that conduct will satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement.
ii. Acts Occurring Outside the United States
More often, the plaintiffs argument for jurisdiction will rest on conduct of the
director that took place abroad, in the issuer's home jurisdiction, but caused effects in the
United States. In the case of inside directors, plaintiffs are often able to establish specific
conduct that leads to such effects-in the form of active involvement in creating and
disseminating documents, or in speaking publicly for the corporation. 7 5 Outside directors,
72. Cf In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 323-24 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "the
'fiduciary shield' doctrine is still causing some confusion," and concluding that it does not limit the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants); but see Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 247 F. Supp. 2d 579,
587-88 (D. Del. 2003) (noting that "[c]ourts... have concluded that where a board member's only contact with
the forum has been in the scope of his corporate capacity, the individual's contact is insufficient to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction," and apparently requiring evidence that the director "availed himself as an
individual of the privileges of the United States").
73. In re Royal Ahold Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351 (D. Md. 2004) (citation omitted); see also In
re Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir.
1996); SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1997).
74. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Trans. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 550 n.10 (D.N.J. 2005) ("Moreover,
even if the fiduciary shield doctrine were to apply in the instant case, the exceptions to this doctrine, (1) the
commission of tortious acts in a corporate capacity, and (2) the violation of a statutory scheme that provides for
personal, as well as corporate liability, are applicable.").
75. See In re Alstom S.A. Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering jurisdiction
over an inside director, noting that "it would have been foreseeable to those creating and disseminating the
[registration statements] that the documents would have an effect in the United States").
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in contrast, do not generally participate actively in the creation of corporate filings; nor
do they generally speak for the corporation or otherwise make independent assertions that
might contain misrepresentations. 76 It is therefore more difficult for plaintiffs to identify
the sort of foreign conduct that will satisfy the effects test for jurisdiction, which, as
noted above, requires that the conduct lead "directly and foreseeably" to the effects in the
United States. 7 7
In litigation against outside directors, the act most commonly identified as a basis
for personal jurisdiction is that of signing a filing with the SEC. A majority of the board
must sign any offering documents 78 as well as the issuer's annual report.79 Several cases
have held that the signing of such filings is a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction
over directors of foreign corporations in claims arising out of misrepresentations or
omissions in those filings. 80 Because persons who sign them should know that the filings
will be relied upon by investors in the United States, these courts reason, their act in
signing meets the effects test. 8 1
When the directors in question did not actually sign a document filed with the SEC,
plaintiffs may attempt to show some other conduct that directly caused injury to investors
in the United States. This may be possible where there is clear evidence of a director's
approval of a document giving rise to the claim.8 2 It is more difficult with respect to
outside directors who merely play a traditional monitoring role. General allegations that
76. See Sale, supra note 23, at 1378, 1388.
77. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); supra text
accompanying note 55; SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that the conduct in
question must have had a "direct and an unmistakably foreseeable effect within the United States"); In re Royal
Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (2006) (providing the signing requirements for a registration statement); SEC Form
F-i (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formf-l.pdf.
79. SEC Form 20-F (April 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms20-f.pdf. On signing-
based liability generally, see Christian J. Mixer, Individual Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws for
Misstatements in Corporate SEC Filings, 56 Bus. LAW. 967 (2001).
80. TCS Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Apax Partners, L.P., No. 06-CV-13447 (CM), 2008 WL 650385, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 352; In re Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 399
(holding, at the stage of a motion to dismiss, that signed filings were sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction); In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). But see In re
AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 453, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying plaintiffs' request for leave to
amend their complaint to allege that two directors had signed an allegedly fraudulent filing, stating that the
"signing, undoubtedly in a foreign country, is insufficient for personal jurisdiction in this case"). See also
Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 364 F. Supp. 2d 362, 391 (D. Del. 2005) (holding that signing the
registration statement was not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a case in which the relevant claims
were not Securities Act claims based on that registration statement).
81. See, e.g., In re CINAR, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06 (finding that jurisdiction existed because "[a]s
General Counsel, [defendant] must have known that the statement was released in connection with a secondary
stock offering designed to attract American investment").
82. In one such case, the plaintiff provided a letter from the defendant indicating that he had approved the
filing in question. Although he had not signed the filing, the court concluded that it was "reasonable to conclude
that [he] . . . knew or should have known that the Form 20-F he approved would be ... relied on by potential
investors," and therefore that a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction had been made. Itoba Ltd. v. LEP
Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 41 (D. Conn. 1996). See also In re Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 401 ("If [the
outside director] were sufficiently responsible for the contents and dissemination of the Registration Statements,
then this fact would support the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction .... "); Apax, 2008 WL 650385, at *12
(suggesting in dicta that the approval of documents would be sufficient to meet the jurisdictional standard).
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defendants-as board members-had knowledge of particular misstatements or
omissions, or authorized the distribution of reports containing them, are often rejected as
a variant of the status-based theory. 83 Such allegations may meet with a procedural
objection as well: they may be characterized as an attempt at group pleading, and rejected
on that basis.84 Thus, outside directors charged only with failure to monitor will typically
not be subject to jurisdiction in the United States. As one court put it, "any fraudulent
activities that Defendants may have committed in relation to [the issuer's] public
offerings cannot reasonably be deemed the 'direct and foreseeable result' of the alleged
failure of an outside director residing in [a foreign country] to monitor the [corporation's]
affairs." 85
One recent case, part of the litigation involving the Italian company Parmalat,
explored the outer reach of jurisdiction based on a failure to supervise. 86 There, the
Southern District of New York considered jurisdiction over an Italian economics
professor who served on the Board of Statutory Auditors of Parmalat's holding company.
She had not signed any documents filed in the United States, but the Board on which she
served had issued audit reports related to Parmalat's financial and accounting controls.87
The court considered these issues in the following way:
The complaint here alleges that Parmalat securities traded actively in the
United States, that Parmalat made note offerings here, and that company
documents including Statutory Board reports were posted on company web
sites in English. All or much of this presumably was known to Prof. Martellini.
In consequence, if plaintiffs can prove their allegations against Prof. Martellini
[that she knew or should have known of fraud], it would be quite appropriate to
conclude that her conduct in relation to the United States satisfied the minimum
contacts test.
88
In that case, however, the court specifically noted that the plaintiffs' allegations related
not merely to a failure of oversight, but to specific representations, made in the reports
83. See supra Part III.B.1 .a; see also In re AstraZeneca, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 467 ("A person's status as a
board member is not alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction.").
84. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (noting that the plaintiffs "include [defendant] in
their broad group pleadings and allege that he acted as a control person, but they fail to note a single specific
act" taken by him). Prior to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),
most courts adopted a presumption that an issuer's publication of documents such as annual reports or press
releases represented the collective action of its officers and directors, thereby relieving plaintiffs of the need to
attribute such publications to specific individuals. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440
(9th Cir. 1987). While most often applied to officers, the doctrine could also be applied to directors with a
particular oversight responsibility, such as those serving on an audit committee. See In re Livent, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying the doctrine to allegations against members of an
issuer's audit committee). Following the enactment of the PSLRA, many courts have concluded that the group
pleading doctrine must be rejected as incompatible with that statute's heightened pleading requirements. See
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 n.6 (2007) (recognizing the split among courts
on this point, but declining to overturn the holding of the court below that, at least with respect to allegations of
scienter, the group pleading doctrine is no longer available).
85. Charas v. Sand Tech. Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5638 (JFK), 1992 WL 296406, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
7, 1992) (considering a foreign director of a Canadian company who was a citizen and resident of Japan).
86. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
87. Id. at451-56.
88. Id. at 456.
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issued by the board of auditors and in Parmalat's financial statements, claimed to have
been either recklessly made or deliberately false.8
9
2. The "Reasonableness" Requirement
To satisfy the constitutional due process requirements, even if a court concludes that
the defendant has established sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, it must
also find that the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant would be reasonable. As the
Supreme Court's decision in Asahi instructs, 90 reasonableness depends on the balance
between the burden on the defendant, on the one hand, and the interests of the forum state
and of the plaintiff, on the other. Additionally, as some courts have noted, the less
substantial the defendant's contacts are with the forum, the more clearly the balance of
these factors must weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction. 9 1 In securities claims as in
other types of litigation, this standard makes for a fact-dependent and often unpredictable
analysis.
Some courts hearing securities claims have focused primarily on the interests of the
forum-in particular, on the interest of the United States in enforcing its regulatory
laws.92 In In re Royal Ahold, for instance, the court concluded that "the burden on the
defendants is outweighed .... [T]he United States has [an] interest in preventing fraud
here, in protecting the integrity of its stock markets, in promoting investor confidence,
and in providing relief under federal statutes to those harmed by securities fraud."
93
Other courts have focused more on the interests of the plaintiff in obtaining a remedy.
This analysis may cut either way. In Parmalat, a case in which the issuer was insolvent,
the court's emphasis on the plaintiff's interests led to an extension of jurisdiction over a
foreign director. The court recognized the potential litigation burden on the Italian
defendant, but stressed "most notably the interest of the United States in securing
relief.., for U.S. citizens injured here ... ."94 By contrast, in litigation involving the
Japanese tire manufacturer Bridgestone, the court's focus on the plaintiff led to the
opposite result. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals there noted:
The key defendants, we think, are Bridgestone and Firestone, the two corporate
entities with substantial ongoing business affairs in the United States. The
court's personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendants ... is conceded.
89. Id. at 452. Although the court concluded that there was a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, it limited that jurisdiction to claims arising out of the effects in the United States-in other words,
to the claims of U.S. investors. Id. at 456-57. (Even those claims were then dismissed, for failure to allege the
fraud with sufficient particularity.) See also Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 86, 95 (D.
Del. 2002) (noting that although the director in question did not sign the filing, he had been actively involved in
its preparation and dissemination, which was held sufficient to warrant jurisdictional discovery). The claims in
that case were later dismissed after discovery, largely on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to establish that their
claims arose out of the defendants' contacts with the United States. In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 247
F. Supp. 2d 579 (D. Del. 2003).
90. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
91. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); see also In re Royal Ahold Sec. Litig., 351 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 352-53 (D. Md. 2004).
92. This is a common focus in "national contacts" cases in which the claims are based on federal statutes.
93. In re Royal Ahold Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 353 (D. Md. 2004).
94. In re Parmalat, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
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Thus, the marginal addition of [Bridgestone's former president and CEO]
would add little or nothing to the potential recovery should the plaintiffs
ultimately prevail on the merits and be awarded damages .... "[Njo actual
violation of securities laws would go unpunished, and any [recovery] is highly
unlikely to be affected by [his] dismissal." 95
The court concluded that the interest of the forum and the interest of the plaintiff in
obtaining relief-the two factors to weigh against the burden on the foreign defendant-
were "relatively light."'96 As these and other cases indicate, the reasonableness
requirement can function in securities litigation as an independent limitation on personal
jurisdiction over foreign directors, even when those directors have established sufficient
contacts with the United States.
9 7
IV. ALIGNING JURISDICTIONAL LAW AND SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT GOALS
Two initial conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis relate simply to the
status of the doctrine in this area. The first is that the scope of personal jurisdiction over
foreign directors remains unclear. (Unfortunately, that conclusion applies in other
substantive areas as well: U.S. law on personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants has
long been criticized as incoherent and dysfunctional. 98) This vagueness results in certain
system costs. Foreign issuers and the individuals serving as their directors experience
uncertainty regarding the possible consequences of securities activity in the United
States, and may, as a result of their inability to evaluate potential liability, refrain from
engaging in that activity. In addition, cross-border securities claims tend to involve
extensive litigation of jurisdictional questions, expensive in terms of costs to the litigants
and burden on the judicial system.
The second conclusion is that, in certain respects, jurisdictional law does not mesh
well with the substantive goals of securities enforcement. Here the issue is not one of
general costs, but rather of the possibility that jurisdictional rules will interfere with
effective securities regulation. The focus on signing as an act of jurisdictional
significance provides one illustration of this problem. Section 11 of the Securities Act
contemplates liability on a fraudulent registration statement for all directors of the
issuer,99 but only a majority of the issuer's board is required to sign a registration
statement. 10 0 By often requiring an actual signature as a predicate for personal
jurisdiction, the jurisdictional rules largely preclude liability for foreign outside directors
95. City of Monroe Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 666 (6th Cir. 2005).
96. Id. The court went on to note that "[t]hough the United States and the class plaintiffs of course have an
interest in the enforcement of federal securities laws, those interests as against [the former president] are
tempered in the circumstances of this case." Id. (Interestingly, the defendant in this case was not merely a
director, but a former chief officer of the issuer. Id. at 655.)
97. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 352 ("Even though [defendants] have sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States, the court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over
these individuals is reasonable."); cf SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2951 GEL, 2001 WL 43611, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2001) (assuming that the burden on a defendant will hardly ever trump the federal interests at
stake in claims based on federal statutes).
98. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1027 (1995).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(3) (2006).
100. § 77f(a).
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who do not actually sign. 10 1 The "reasonableness" element of the constitutional analysis
provides a second illustration. In assessing whether an exercise of jurisdiction would be
reasonable, a court is required to consider the strength of the plaintiffs compensatory
interest; that interest is one of the factors (along with the interests of the forum state) that
must be balanced against the defendant's litigation burden. 10 2 From a securities
enforcement standpoint, however, it is less clear that the compensatory interest of the
plaintiff deserves substantial weight. If, as many courts and commentators have
concluded, the primary purpose of the civil liability provisions is not to secure a remedy
for the victim of securities fraud but to deter future violations, 10 3 then the extent of the
plaintiffs compensatory interest in a particular case should be considered relatively
insignificant. In other words, the task should be simply balancing the defendant's
litigation burden against the regulatory interests of the United States. Of course,
achieving the appropriate balance between deterrence and compensation is always an
issue in the private enforcement of regulatory law; my point is simply that jurisdictional
law and securities law might strike the balance differently.
These observations lead to the general question whether it might be possible to
improve the alignment of jurisdictional norms with the expectations regarding director
accountability embodied in our securities laws. The following Parts consider some
possible mechanisms for doing so.
A. Increased Reliance on Public Enforcement
The tensions between jurisdictional rules and director accountability norms outlined
above are somewhat less pronounced in the context of public enforcement than in private
litigation. This is not because the constitutional analysis differs in the two contexts; the
due process requirements that apply in a private civil proceeding also apply in a civil
enforcement action brought by the SEC. 104 However, the SEC enjoys wide-ranging
investigatory authority, as well as a broad range of enforcement options in administrative
proceedings. Both may assist it in bringing its authority as regulator to bear in persuading
individuals to consent to its jurisdiction. 10 5 In addition, the SEC has a significant
101. See, e.g., In re Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that absent
the "affirmative act" of signing, an allegation that an outside director was listed as a signatory on a registration
statement would not be enough to establish personal jurisdiction).
102. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
103. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Civil liability under
section 11 and similar provisions was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to
promote enforcement of the Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those who fail in their
duties."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1536 (2006) (noting that in an analysis of securities class action
litigation, "deterrence ... is the only rationale that can justify the significant costs-both public and private-
that securities class actions impose on investors and the judiciary"); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1314-15 (2008) (discussing the rise of the deterrence justification for private securities
litigation). See generally James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 1 (exploring the deterrence value of private securities lawsuits).
104. See, e.g., SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2951 GEL, 2001 WL 43611, at *2-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,
2001) (analyzing the due process requirements in a civil enforcement action).
105. One recent case may illustrate this point. In proceedings against Royal Ahold, a Dutch issuer, a
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comparative advantage over private plaintiffs in cases involving cross-border fraud, due
to cooperation agreements of various kinds that lessen certain procedural difficulties
common in international litigation. For instance, the SEC has entered into bilateral
Memoranda of Understanding, which provide for cross-border cooperation and
enforcement assistance, with securities regulators in many other countries. 106 Thus, it is
easier for the SEC to obtain access to documentary evidence located abroad than it is for
a private plaintiff. Similarly, such instruments often permit the SEC to participate
alongside foreign regulators in taking testimony from foreign witnesses-another
procedural advantage over private litigants. 
10 7
For these reasons, increasing the public enforcement of director accountability
norms might be one way of ameliorating the jurisdictional problems. Such a step would
be consistent with arguments made in the purely domestic context as well. Many
commentators, pointing to the SEC's arsenal of investigative and remedial tools, have
argued that SEC administrative and civil enforcement action is generally superior to
private litigation in securing compliance with the accountability norms applicable to
independent directors. 108
Even if the SEC were to assume a more active role in monitoring foreign directors,
however, jurisdictional doctrine in its current state would continue to impair the effective
enforcement of accountability norms in the international setting. This is due to certain
consequences of the overlap between private and public enforcement. First, if U.S. courts
were to adopt an increasingly restrictive view of jurisdiction over foreign directors, their
decisions would create precedent applicable in public civil enforcement actions as well.
This would render civil enforcement by the SEC a less powerful regulatory tool. In
addition, such precedent might eventually encourage foreign directors to resist pressure
Commission administrative action was proceeding against a member of the issuer's supervisory board
simultaneously with a private class action. In re Ture Roland Fahlin, Exchange Act Release No. 50,519, pt. II
(Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50519.htm. The SEC obtained a cease-
and-desist order against that board member, in which he admitted the Commission's jurisdiction for purposes of
that proceeding. Id Two months later, in the private case, the court concluded that minimum contacts had not
been established that would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA
Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354 (D. Md. 2004).
106. See SEC, SEC Framework for International Cooperation and Assistance,
http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/oia/oia crossborder.htm#framework (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (providing
general information on cross-border enforcement instruments, including these bilateral agreements, as well as
the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding).
107. In a recent speech, Commissioner Aguilar credited the SEC's ability to obtain necessary documents in
the Siemens investigation to such instruments. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Combating Securities Fraud At
Home and Abroad (May 28, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO528091aa.htm; see also
Mann et al., supra note 2, at 793-95, 803 ("The broad base of cooperation in evidence-gathering has had a
significant effect on the types of litigation related to securities regulation. It is rarely an issue of whether
documents can be obtained by a foreign regulator; the MOUs and MLATs work.").
108. See Rose, supra note 103, at 1346 ("[T]he Commission has in its enforcement arsenal non-monetary
sanctions, like officer and director bars, that serve as stronger deterrence weapons vis-A-vis individual
wrongdoers than class damages, which fall primarily on corporations under principles of enterprise liability.");
Sale, supra note 23, at 1402 (describing the SEC enforcement powers and concluding that "the SEC process is
arguably more efficient than private litigation" in enforcing the securities monitoring role of outside directors).
On the overlap between public and private enforcement of the securities laws generally, see James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, with the Assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53
DUKE L.J. 737 (2003).
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by the SEC to consent to jurisdiction even in administrative proceedings. The result
would be to reduce the SEC's bargaining power. Alternatively, should U.S. courts move
toward a more expansive view of jurisdiction, the international conflict generated by
aggressive private litigation 10 9 might eventually impair the further development of the
cooperation and coordination mechanisms that are so central to the success of cross-
border public enforcement. 1 10 In other words, regardless of whether the courts ultimately
adopt a broad or a more restrictive view of jurisdiction, the interaction between public
and private enforcement makes it impossible to view the former as a regulatory strategy
entirely independent of the latter. Even apart from the desire to reduce the costs of, and
international conflict created by, cross-border litigation, it therefore remains important to
address the tension between jurisdictional law and the provisions of the securities laws
governing director liability.
B. A Consent-Based Model of Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Securities Litigation
Minimum contacts with the United States, sufficient to satisfy constitutional due
process requirements, form one basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. Where the defendant in question has consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S.
court, however, no minimum-contacts analysis is required: that consent serves as an
entirely independent basis of jurisdiction. 1 11 One straightforward way to clarify the
jurisdictional status of foreign directors, then, would be to impose a listing requirement
that an issuer's directors consent to jurisdiction in U.S. courts for all claims arising out of
that issuer's securities activity.
Requiring foreign directors to consent to jurisdiction in the United States would
have the two-fold benefit of eliminating expensive jurisdictional litigation and treating
foreign directors of listed issuers the same as their domestic counterparts. In addition,
while director consent would obviate the need for minimum-contacts analysis, it would
nevertheless be compatible with the due process values underpinning that analysis. The
conceptual foundation of the fairness standard embodied in the requirement of minimum
contacts is the notion of "reasonable expectations"-that is, the idea that it is only fair to
assert jurisdiction over a defendant if that defendant, by choosing to connect itself with
the forum, could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 112 At least with
respect to foreign companies who have chosen to list their securities on U.S. markets, it is
not unreasonable to assume that directors would expect that they could be sued there in
cases arising out of that securities activity. 113 The listing decision itself, which must be
109. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text for further development of this point.
110. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 29 (1987) (noting the risk that "exorbitant jurisdictional claims can frustrate diplomatic initiatives
by the United States, particularly in the private international law field"). Admittedly, this risk has not seemed to
materialize in the particular context of securities enforcement, given the proliferation of bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1971).
112. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980) ("The foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis is ... that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [State] are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
113. In a related context, the Third Circuit considered whether a foreign company that had sponsored an
ADR program in the United States-Level 1, and therefore not involving a public listing; see supra text
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board-approved, would involve a consideration of the potential securities liability flowing
from U.S. market participation. Indeed, as some observers have argued, potential
litigation burden is one of the primary factors informing that decision. 1 14 Therefore, a
requirement that the directors of such companies expressly consent to personal
jurisdiction in the United States would be consistent with due process standards
applicable in the absence of consent. 11
5
However, while a consent requirement would resolve the uncertainties caused by
current jurisdictional doctrine, it would present several substantial disadvantages. First,
by increasing the likelihood of suit in the United States, it might discourage some
individuals from serving as directors of foreign companies. 116 Second, and in my view
problematically, it would play into the same criticism leveled at expansive assertions of
subject-matter jurisdiction in cases with foreign elements-it would be viewed as yet
another manifestation of the over-aggressive use of U.S. civil litigation to address matters
that might better be solved abroad. Indeed, by explicitly extending U.S. jurisdiction to
this group of foreign defendants, a consent requirement might exacerbate that criticism
by increasing the likelihood that U.S. law would be applied to foreign conduct. 1 17 The
expansive role of U.S. courts in addressing cross-border economic harms contributes to
the friction between the United States and other countries regarding certain elements of
our civil justice system, including class actions and contingency fees. 1 1 8 That friction
worries those concerned about international relations. It also, albeit for entirely different
reasons, worries those concerned about the impact of the litigation burden on the
competitiveness of our capital markets. 
119
accompanying note 14-had thereby subjected itself to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Pinker v. Roche Holdings
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 361-62 (3d Cir. 2002). The court held that "by sponsoring an ADR facility, [the company]
'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities' in the American securities market, and
thereby established the requisite minimum contacts with the United States." Id. at 371. It then concluded that
"[a] foreign corporation that purposefully avails itself of the American securities market has adequate notice
that it may be haled into an American court for fraudulently manipulating that market." Id. at 371-72. Although
that case addressed jurisdiction of the issuer itself rather than of that issuer's directors, its analysis regarding the
foreseeability of litigation in the United States is instructive.
114. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION 11 (2006), available at http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf ("Foreign companies commonly cite the U.S. enforcement system
as the most important reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. market.").
115. I recognize that some of the cases analyzing the contacts of foreign directors with the United States
take a narrower view of what those directors might reasonably anticipate.
116. Some observers suggest that exposure to U.S. litigation dissuades many potential directors from
serving in that capacity, thus limiting the pool of available talent. While foreign directors currently face at least
the prospect of such litigation, under a consent requirement it would be more of a certainty.
117. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the most fundamental questions in cross-border securities
litigation is whether-and to what extent-U.S. law reaches conduct occurring abroad. If U.S. courts were to
adopt a restrictive view of personal jurisdiction over foreign directors, they would have fewer opportunities to
apply U.S. securities law to the conduct of those directors. However, if a consent requirement were adopted, the
set of claims to which U.S. law might be applied would expand.
118. See Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 63-64 (describing foreign hostility to the expansive role of U.S.
courts).
119. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 114, at 11-12; see also COMM. ON CAPITAL
MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 32 (2007), available at
http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMRReport_(5-26-09).pdf (arguing that "the competitiveness of the U.S.
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Finally, the extent to which a consent requirement would serve the fundamental goal
of deterrence is unclear, Because inside directors are more likely than outside directors to
have established contacts within the United States, the primary benefit of a blanket
director consent requirement would be to confer jurisdiction over outside directors
serving in a traditional oversight capacity. But even if foreign outside directors were
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the likelihood that they would face substantive
liability in a private civil lawsuit is low. This is true for a number of reasons, including
the elimination of civil liability for aiding and abetting, 120 the availability to individual
directors of the due diligence defense, 12 1 heightened pleading standards, 122 and the
introduction of proportionate liability in the absence of actual knowledge of fraud. 123 As
a result of director indemnification and insurance practices, the likelihood that an outside
director will incur actual out-of-pocket costs is even lower. 124 There are occasional
counterexamples; for instance, the recent Worldcom litigation resulted in a settlement by
the company's outside directors that included out-of-pocket payments. 12 5 Such cases are
clearly exceptional, however. 126
In sum, with regard to the directors whom a consent requirement would be most
likely to affect, the removal of jurisdictional barriers to lawsuits may be of little practical
consequence. 127 In this light, the substantial negative consequences of requiring directors
to consent to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts would not be outweighed by the marginal
gain likely in enforcement benefits.
C. Presumptions of Jurisdiction in Particular Categories of Claims
Despite the fact that the lack of personal jurisdiction over directors may not
significantly affect their eventual liability with respect to certain claims, there is
nevertheless a class of claims that jurisdictional rules should not bar. These are claims
public equity market has significantly deteriorated in recent years" and advocating a decrease in "the burden of
regulation and litigation.., to help remedy the situation").
120. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
121. This defense is available in situations in which liability is predicated on control person status. See
FANTO, supra note 24, § 6:4.2.
122. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act established a requirement, applicable to most forms
of securities fraud, that any complaint based on a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission must specify the
statement in question and, if made on information and belief, must "state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006). Where it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference" that the defendant acted with that state of mind. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(0; applicable in section 11 claims via 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)(2).
124. See generally Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (analyzing applicable substantive and procedural law as well as indemnification
practices, insurance practices, and settlement incentives, and concluding as an empirical matter that out-of-
pocket liability for outside directors is extremely rare).
125. In re Worldcom, 388 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Coffee, supra note 103, at 1552-53
(discussing some of the largest out-of-pocket settlements).
126. See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 124, at 1140 (describing this as "deterrence by occasional
lightning strike").
127. Even in the Parmalat litigation, for instance-an outlier case in which personal jurisdiction over an
outside director was recognized-the claim was ultimately dismissed for failure to allege fraud with sufficient
particularity. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 449, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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involving provisions of the securities laws in which Congress has expressly assigned
particular governance obligations to directors. One important set of claims falling into
this category are section 11 claims. Congress's clear intent in giving purchasers a cause
of action against "every person who was a director" of the issuer at the time of a
registration statement's filing was to assign responsibility for the accuracy of that
statement to all members of an issuer's board. 128 Similarly, jurisdictional rules should not
bar claims against directors who serve on an issuer's audit committee that arise out of
fraud in the financial statements included in U.S. filings. Rules enacted pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act require issuers to establish audit committees meeting certain criteria
of independence, 12 9 and to provide specific disclosure in their annual reports regarding
the financial expertise of that committee. 130 Those rules reflect congressional intent to
enhance the accountability of specific individuals for the accuracy of such filings; indeed,
that enhancement was one of the primary goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 13 1
Claims such as these, based upon fraud in a filing for which the director defendant
bears a specific governance obligation expressly imposed by Congress, stand in contrast
to claims based upon general anti-fraud provisions that allege the director's failure to
monitor management. In my view, the difference between them is relevant to the
jurisdictional analysis in cases involving foreign directors. Where the intent of Congress
to hold a director accountable for the content of a particular filing is clear, permitting
foreign directors to avoid potential liability for resulting fraud on jurisdictional grounds is
inconsistent with that intent and leads to unequal application of the law. On the other
hand, where the claim in question rests only on a foreign director's alleged failure to
oversee the activities of a foreign issuer-a failure that implicates primarily the
corporation law of the issuer's country of incorporation rather than U.S. securities law-
the need to delimit the boundaries of U.S. judicial jurisdiction is at its strongest. There
are, of course, claims that fall between these two poles-for instance, claims that are
brought under general anti-fraud rules, but that allege not merely a failure of oversight
but rather the active involvement of a director in fraudulent conduct. 132 It is with respect
to the claims at the two poles, however, that the jurisdictional analysis can be
categorically, rather than on a case-by-case basis, aligned with the enforcement goals
128. It is important to note that registration statements on Form F-6---used in connection with Level 1 or
Level 2 ADR programs-do not trigger section 11 liability at all. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text. Thus, this discussion addresses only claims arising out of fraud in registration statements covering either
Level 3 ADRs or a foreign issuer's ordinary shares.
129. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006); § 78j-l(m); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2009).
130. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006).
131. Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels":
Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 627, 636 (2007) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was essentially a response to the perceived
inadequacy of 'gatekeeper' involvement of the sort provided by outside directors on audit committees .... "). In
the context of claims against officers rather than directors, I would add to this category of claims those arising
out of fraud in filings for which Congress has imposed specific certification requirements on those officers. For
example, rules enacted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provide that the CEO and CFO of a listed foreign
company must sign certifications to be included with the company's annual reports. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14
(2009) (applicable to filings on Form 20-F).
132. Certain kinds of administrative proceedings may fall between these poles as well, although in a very
different context: for instance, a claim against a foreign director on the basis that the director controlled a
person who engaged in insider trading of a foreign issuer's unlisted ADRs. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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reflected in the securities laws.
This Article advocates a two-pronged presumption: (1) in a claim against a foreign
director based upon a corporate filing with respect to which Congress has expressly
created a director accountability requirement, there should be a strong presumption that
the director is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court; and (2) in a claim
against a foreign director based only upon allegations that the director failed to meet his
or her oversight responsibilities over management, there should be a strong presumption
that the director is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court.
A presumption that a foreign director is subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court in
cases where Congress has established specific director accountability requirements would
be consistent with constitutional due process values on a theory of implied consent. 133 A
director who assumes a responsibility for a particular filing that Congress has explicitly
assigned to that director must be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S.
court in litigation based on that filing. 134 Moreover, establishing such a presumption
would not require a wholesale reorientation of the emerging jurisprudence regarding
jurisdiction over foreign directors; rather, it would eliminate the vagueness of the
constitutional analysis in the cases for which director accountability is most clearly
demanded by Congress. As the analysis above suggests, under that jurisprudence the
fulfillment of certification and signing requirements are already generally seen to
establish the requisite minimum contacts; with respect to that prong of the jurisdictional
analysis, then, the presumption would merely expand jurisdiction to cover non-signing
directors in section 11 claims. 135 The primary effect of the presumption would be on the
reasonableness prong of the analysis, which would be foreclosed as an independent basis
for refusing jurisdiction over foreign directors. 136 In other words, in claims based on
filings for which a foreign director bears an explicit accountability obligation, that
director would be presumptively subject to jurisdiction in the United States despite the
fact that litigating there might be burdensome. 13 7
133. See Ins. Corp. of fr., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) ("Because
the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights,
be waived .... A variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the
personal jurisdiction of the court.").
134. This presumption therefore adopts a narrower view of consent than that discussed in Part IV.B, supra:
directors would be deemed to consent to jurisdiction not in all securities claims, but only in those alleging a
failure to meet specific securities-related obligations.
135. It is here worth noting that section 11 liability does not attach in claims based on Form F-6 (used in
Level I and Level 2 ADR programs). American Depositary Receipts, Securities Act Release No. 6894, 1991
WL 294145 (May 23, 1991). Therefore, foreign directors would be exposed to that liability only if the issuer
had engaged in the public offering of securities to U.S. investors, whether in the form of ordinary shares or by
means of a Level 3 ADR program. The presumption would also prevent misapplications of doctrines like the
fiduciary shield doctrine to protect directors from Congressionally-imposed responsibilities.
136. Currently, as discussed above, courts that find that a defendant has established minimum contacts with
the United States will nevertheless consider reasonableness as a second step of the jurisdictional analysis. See,
e.g., Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 401 (2005) (indicating that an inside director who created and
disseminated allegedly misleading documents would still have an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of
an assertion ofjurisdiction over him).
137. The presumption would therefore foreclose the application of the reasonableness requirement to
protect directors, and even corporate officers, from litigation in the United States resulting from their failure to
fulfill their statutory responsibilities. Compare this with the reasoning in City of Monroe Employees Retirement
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Importantly, the proposed presumptions would affect only the jurisdictional status of
foreign directors in U.S. litigation. Even when they would operate to treat an issuer's
directors collectively, then-as in the section 11 context, where all directors would be
presumed subject to jurisdiction-director liability would continue to be assessed
individually under the relevant substantive provisions. Under that section, for instance,
directors have the opportunity to establish a due diligence defense on an individualized
basis. 138 Therefore, while a foreign director who had reasonably relied on management
representations in approving a registration statement could not avoid a section 11 claim
on jurisdictional grounds, the presumption would not affect her ultimate liability. Thus,
the thrust of the presumptions would not be to expand or contract the substantive liability
of foreign directors under securities law, but simply to align jurisdictional standards with
Congress's regulatory expectations in shaping director behavior by means of specific
accountability requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen a steady and quite dramatic increase in securities litigation
with foreign elements. 139 Resolving the jurisdictional and procedural questions that
surround such claims is crucial to improving the efficiency of private litigation in the
cross-border context. Yet the ultimate goal is not simply to streamline the process of
private litigation-it is to shape an appropriate role for private enforcement within the
complex matrix of mechanisms used to regulate global economic conduct. It is therefore
critical to bear in mind the points at which private enforcement intersects with other U.S.
enforcement strategies, including international enforcement efforts by the SEC, alone or
in cooperation with foreign regulators. It is equally critical to remain aware of the effect
on foreign relations of increased U.S. judicial activity in the international arena. Only
with attention to this larger context can private litigation develop as an effective element
of, rather than an interference with, global financial regulatory strategies.
System v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005), where, considering jurisdiction over the issuer's
former president and CEO, the court focused on the "substantial burden" that litigation would place upon the
defendant, noting that "[he] is living in Japan, and is a retired senior citizen at that." Id. at 666.
138. See Escott v. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643, 684-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing the relational nature of
the due diligence defense).
139. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2009 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT 7,
fig. 6 (2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch/2009_YIR/
CornerstoneResearchFilings_2009 MidYear Assessment.pdf (providing statistics on the upward trend in
class action filings against issuers with headquarters outside the United States).
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